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 INTRODUCTION 
Article 9 of the current own resources decision1 calls on the Commission to 
"undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources system, 
accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of all relevant factors, 
including the effects of enlargement on the financing of the budget, the possibility of 
modifying the structure of the own resources by creating new autonomous own resources 
and the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United Kingdom as well as the 
granting to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction pursuant to 
Article 5(1)”. 
In response to a request from the European Parliament and in agreement with the Council, the 
Commission committed itself to present the abovementioned review on the functioning of the 
financing system before the end of 2004. 
On 10 February 2004 the Commission adopted its communication2 on the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013. The communication identified two main elements of the current own 
resources system deserving closer attention: first, the insufficient transparency of the system 
for EU citizens combined with limited financial autonomy from national treasuries; secondly, 
the need to reform the existing mechanism for correction of negative budgetary imbalances. 
In line with those orientations, this report provides an overview of the current system and its 
main drawbacks, proposes a generalised correction mechanism as a short term adjustment in 
order to address the main outstanding issue and outlines for the longer term an own resources 
structure that would be effective, transparent and democratic. 
A more detailed assessment of these issues can be found in the Commission working 
document annexed to this report. 
1. THE CURRENT OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM 
The current own resources system is the result of successive modifications of the 
original system introduced in 1970. The system may be divided into the following 
three categories: 
(1) Traditional own resources (TOR). These are mainly customs duties collected 
by Member States on behalf of the EU.  
(2) The resource based on value added tax (VAT). The VAT resource is levied 
on the statistical ‘notional’ harmonised VAT bases of Member States, which 
is calculated on the basis of national VAT receipts.  
 
Furthermore, the notional VAT base is 'capped', where applicable, at 50 % of 
each Member State’s gross national income (GNI) to reduce the effect of the 
slightly ‘regressive’ character of VAT. In practice, this turns the VAT-based 
own resource into a GNI-based resource for the countries concerned by the 
capping rule.  
 
The call rate on VAT cannot exceed 0.5 % of the base.  
                                               
1 Council decision (2000/597, EC, Euratom) on the system of the European Communities' own resources, 
OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42. 
2 COM(2004) 101 final of 10 February 2004. 
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(3) The GNI-based resource. This is the residual resource used to balance the 
budget. It is levied as a uniform rate in proportion to the GNI of each Member 
State. There is no particular limit on this rate other than the own resources 
ceiling that limits the total amount of all own resources to a maximum of 
1.24 % of the EU's GNI. 
Finally, a specific mechanism for correcting the budgetary imbalance of the United 
Kingdom is also part of the own resources system (see section 3). It has been 
modified on several occasions, rendering the mechanism increasingly complex and 
non-transparent. 
The latest changes to the own resources system were decided by the European 
Council in Berlin in 1999. These changes further reinforced the declining trend of 
traditional and VAT-based own resources and the corresponding increase in the 
relative share of the GNP3/GNI-based contributions. 
Table 1 – The composition of EU own resources 
(in per cent of total own resources; cash basis) 
OWN RESOURCES 1996-2005 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 2003 20042 20053 
TOR 19,1% 18,8% 17,2% 16,8% 17,4% 18,1% 11,9% 13,0% 12,0% 11,4% 
VAT 51,3% 45,5% 40,3% 37,8% 39,9% 38,7% 28,8% 25,4% 14,6% 14,1% 
GNP/GNI 29,6% 35,7% 42,5% 45,4% 42,7% 43,2% 59,3% 61,6% 73,4% 74,5% 
Total own 
resources (€ billion) 71,1 75,3 82,2 82,5 88,0 80,7 77,7 83,6 93,3 108,5 
1 As from 2002 the % of TOR retained by Member States as a compensation for their collection costs was raised from 10 % to 25 %.
 This difference represented about € 2.2 billion in 2002 as well as in 2003. 
2 Preliminary draft amending budget 8/2004 (EU-25). 
3 Preliminary draft budget 2005. 
2. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CURRENT OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM 
2.1. Assessment criteria 
The own resources system and individual own resources can be assessed against 
specific criteria. It is virtually impossible for individual own resources to satisfy all 
possible assessment criteria. However, a system based on a combination of resources 
of different nature may reasonably meet the main relevant criteria. 
                                               
3 Prior to 2002, the GNP (gross national product) resource. 
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The following seven assessment criteria are considered relevant to this report: 
· Visibility and simplicity;  
· Financial autonomy;  
· Adding to the efficient allocation of economic resources;  
· Sufficiency;  
· Administrative cost-effectiveness;  
· Revenue-Stability; 
· Equity in gross contributions;  
2.2. Assessment 
The current system has performed well as regards the criteria of sufficiency and 
stability, but clearly fails to fulfil the visibility and simplicity criterion and does not 
contribute significantly to a more efficient allocation of economic resources in the 
EU. The financing system has grown increasingly complex over time, making it 
difficult even for the interested citizen to understand how it works. Financial 
autonomy is, furthermore, becoming more and more limited. Although the financing 
of the budget is ensured by rules that are binding for all Member States, there is 
virtually no direct link to citizens or tax-payers. Instead the financing of the budget 
relies on transfers from national treasuries. As for the remaining criteria the current 
financing system has shown various shortcomings, as explained more in detail in the 
Commission working document annexed to this report. 
3. PREVENTING EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE BUDGETARY BALANCES 
3.1. The issue of budgetary imbalances 
The European Union is a community of solidarity with parts of the EU budget 
serving a clear solidarity goal, while others fund the achievement of specific 
objectives through EU agreed programmes. That gives rise to budgetary net benefits 
from, and net contributions to the EU budget, although the policy benefits accrue to 
the Union as a whole. 
Budgetary net balances, measured by the difference between contributions to and 
receipts from the EU budget, obviously fail to account fully for the benefits resulting 
from membership in the EU.  
Nevertheless, the size of some of these imbalances has been at the centre of political 
discussions. In 1984 the Fontainebleau European Council introduced the existing 
correction mechanism with regard to the net contribution of one member state, the 
UK. This mechanism reimburses the UK by 2/3 of its net contributions according to 
the concept of allocated expenditure. The introduction was based on the general 
principle that 
'… any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to 
its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.' 
Although the correction was only decided for the UK, the principle of a generalised 
correction was therefore already acknowledged in Fontainebleau ('any Member 
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State'), with the correction to be based on the size of the budgetary imbalance 
('excessive') and the wealth of a Member State compared to the EU as a whole 
('relative prosperity'). 
Over the last 20 years, economic developments, enlargement and changes in the 
structure of the EU budget have significantly modified the context in which the 
existing UK correction mechanism operates. 
The table below shows the development of gross national income (GNI) per capita, 
expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS4), between the years 1984 and 2003 
for all Member States that were net contributors to the EU budget in the year 20025. 
GNI per capita of net contributors (in PPS) 
(EU-15 average. = 100) 
 2003 1984 
United Kingdom 111.2 90.6 
Denmark 111.1 104.0 
Austria 109.8 -- 
Netherlands 106.6 95.0 
Sweden 104.6 -- 
France 104.2 104.0 
Germany 98.6 109.6 
Italy 97.3 92.9 
In view of the dramatic shift in the UK´s position compared to the other net 
contributors and in application of the Fontainebleau principle the granting of a 
correction on an exclusive basis to the UK should be re-considered. Therefore, the 
existing mechanism should be transformed into a generalized correction mechanism, 
respecting the twin goals of 
 preventing excessive negative budgetary balances combined with a 
reduction of differences between net contributors at comparable levels of 
prosperity; 
 ensuring that the financing costs of the mechanism are kept at a 
reasonable level. 
3.2. Impact of the existing correction mechanism on the net balances of  
 Member States 
In the existing mechanism the UK’s reimbursement of its net contribution is 66%. 
The mechanism is financed by all Member States according to their respective shares 
in GNI with the following exceptions: 
– The UK does not participate in the financing of its own rebate 
– The share of DE, NL, AT and SE is restricted to 25% of their normal shares 
                                               
4 The PPS is an artificial currency that reflects differences in national price levels that are not taken into 
account by exchange rates. This unit allows meaningful volume comparisons of economic indicators 
among countries.  
5 Net balances presented in this document, like those used for the UK correction, are calculated including 
administrative expenditure. For this reason, Belgium and Luxembourg do not appear among the net 
contributors. As the correction is paid one year later, the 2007 correction is to be paid in 2008. 
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While the UK´s net position before correction has changed little since its 
introduction (-0,48% of GNI in 1985 and -0,47% during the period from 1996 to 
2002), its final net position has improved significantly compared to other Member 
States at similar or even lower levels of prosperity, like NL and DE (-0.47% and -
0.44%, respectively). 
A very significant factor for assessing the existing correction mechanism is its 
impact of enlargement. With the accession of new net beneficiaries the net balances 
of all old Member States will deteriorate as a growing share of expenditure is 
allocated to the new Member States. However, as a consequence of the current 
mechanism the volume of the correction will increase very significantly for the UK. 
The cost for the other Member States, including all new Member States, will 
increase. Should the current correction mechanism remain in force, the UK 
correction would, according to Commission estimates on the basis of the 
Commission’s proposal for the 2007-2013 financial perspective, increase by more 
than 50%. 
3.3. The proposed generalised correction mechanism 
The Commission proposes a generalization of the correction mechanism, evolving 
from the existing correction in order to bring the system closer to the original 
objective of avoiding excessive budgetary burdens. By introducing a sort of ‘safety 
net’ for large net contributors whose net contribution exceed a certain level, it may 
also facilitate a more constructive approach to ensure budgetary means to meet the 
policy challenges of the enlarged Union.  
The future correction is to be calculated on the basis of the net budgetary balance of 
each Member State in relation to the budget of the EU. The mechanism should be 
triggered if net contributions exceed a threshold, expressed as a percentage of each 
Member State’s GNI, reflecting the minimum accepted level of unlimited financial 
solidarity between Member States. Net positions exceeding such a threshold will be 
eligible for a correction (partial refund), thus giving an insurance against excessive 
net contributions. Conversely, the total volume of corrections (refund volume) will 
be limited to a maximum amount, thus insuring those not benefiting from a 
correction against excessive costs of the mechanism. If the sum of all corrections 
exceeds the total predetermined volume, the refund rate is reduced accordingly. 
Any correction mechanism entails complications to the financing of the budget. 
Therefore the basic proposal should be relatively simple and sufficiently transparent. 
In this respect, the current parameters used for the UK correction calculation should 
be modified only where necessary and simplified whenever feasible.  
The new mechanism proposed by the Commission contains the following elements: 
– setting a threshold level as a percentage of GNI; 
– capping the total volume of corrections; 
– simplifying the financing of the corrections by basing them on GNI shares, 
whereby all Member States participate in the financing of the global amount of the 
corrections in proportion to their relative prosperity; 
– keeping the concept of allocated expenditure and the re-imbursement rate up to 
the maximum volume unchanged. 
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According to this proposal, the UK would be by far the largest beneficiary from the 
generalised correction mechanism. According to the Commission´s proposal on the 
next Financial Perspective and the proposal on a generalized correction mechanism, 
the UK would receive on average a net compensation approximately twice as much 
as that of D. 
Table 6. Estimated net budgetary balances (average 2008-2013) 
 in % of GNI 
 GCM Current ORD No correction 
United Kingdom -0.51% -0.25% -0.62% 
Netherlands -0.48% -0.56% -0.55% 
Germany -0.48% -0.54% -0.52% 
Sweden -0.45% -0.50% -0.47% 
Austria -0.41% -0.38% -0.37% 
Italy -0.35% -0.41% -0.29% 
France -0.33% -0.37% -0.27% 
Cyprus6 -0.33% -0.37% -0.28% 
Denmark -0.25% -0.31% -0.20% 
Finland -0.19% -0.25% -0.14% 
Spain 0.26% 0.23% 0.32% 
Ireland 0.51% 0.47% 0.56% 
Malta 1.10% 1.06% 1.16% 
Belgium7 1.27% 1.21% 1.32% 
Slovenia 1.34% 1.31% 1.40% 
Portugal 1.54% 1.50% 1.60% 
Greece 2.20% 2.16% 2.25% 
Hungary 3.09% 3.06% 3.15% 
Czech Republic 3.21% 3.17% 3.26% 
Slovakia 3.31% 3.27% 3.36% 
Estonia 3.79% 3.76% 3.85% 
Poland 3.80% 3.76% 3.85% 
Lithuania 4.44% 4.41% 4.50% 
Latvia 4.45% 4.40% 4.51% 
Luxembourg7 5.84% 5.80% 5.89% 
The table above illustrates Member States’ estimated average net budgetary balances 
resulting from the proposed generalised correction mechanism over the period till 
2013 and compares it to the continuation of the current mechanism and to a situation 
without any correction. 
The generalized correction mechanism will decrease the negative net balances, 
reduce the spread among net contributors, and, on the other hand, lessen the 
financing burden of those who do not benefit from the mechanism8. 
The Commission presents separately a specific proposal for modifying the current 
own resources decision in view of introducing the proposed generalised correction 
mechanism. 
                                               
6 Estimates based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. 
7 When excluding administrative expenditure, Belgium and Luxembourg appear as net contributors. 
8 See attached technical annex for more detail. 
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4. THE OWN RESOURCES STRUCTURE 
4.1. Finding the optimal own resources structure 
Three basic alternatives for the financing of the EU budget are discussed below. In 
all three cases traditional own resources (TOR) would be maintained, as the 
collection of import duties constitutes an instrument of the Union's trade policy 
whose yield 'naturally' accrues to the Union. 
(1) Maintaining the present financing system unchanged  
 
The present financing system has ensured a smooth financing of the EU 
budget. However, in its present form the financing system lacks a direct link 
to citizens. Past adjustments to accommodate specific interests have added to 
the system’s opaqueness. The budgetary consequences of the Union’s policies 
thus remain impalpable to the general public. With the overwhelming weight 
of the GNI resource, Member States, and in particular net contributors, tend 
to judge EU policies and initiatives exclusively in terms of their national 
allocation and with little regard to the substance of policies, with the risk of 
obscuring the added value of EU policies.  
 
Because of the absence of any link to and visibility for EU citizens, and the 
increasing incentive to focus on narrow budgetary concept of 'juste retour', 
the current system should be reformed. 
(2) A purely GNI-based financing system  
 
Under a financing system exclusively based on the GNI key the Union would 
entirely depend on 'contributions' from Member States. The advantage of 
such a system is that it would be simple and easy to understand. The 
‘contributions’ would correspond closely to Member States´ relative 
prosperity. But financing the budget by contributions of the Member States 
may be adequate for an international organization such as the UN. It does, 
however, not reflect the status of the European Union.It would imply an idea 
of the Union in which citizens would be represented purely indirectly by their 
Member States. The status of the EU as a Union of Member States and the 
citizens, which is currently reflected in the Treaty, would be abandoned on 
the financing side of the budget. This, in turn, would imply ditching the 
concept of 'own' resources which has been a cornerstone of EU finances since 
the first own resources decision in 1970. The Commission rejects such an 
alternative. 
(3) A financing system based on fiscal own resources 
 
A system based to a large degree on tax-based own resources has the potential 
to increase the financial autonomy of the EU budget by creating a more direct 
financial relationship between the EU budget and EU citizens. The shift 
towards individuals and economic operators as contributors, and the 
corresponding reduction of Member States' contributions to the financing of 
the EU budget would entail higher visibility towards citizens and thus 
increased political accountability of the budgetary authority for their 
expenditure decisions. It would also contribute to shifting the political 
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discussion away from the narrow focus on national contributions towards the 
merit of EU policies and the general European interest. Finally, increased 
visibility would enhance trust in the EU’s finances, whose volume of less 
than 2.5% of total public expenditure in the EU is often over-estimated.  
 
However, also a fully tax-based financing of the EU budget does not appear 
appropriate. As the balanced budget requirement of Art. 268 of the treaty is 
not and should not be put into question, a fiscal resource assuming the current 
role of GNI as 'residual' balancing resource would either involve a variable 
tax rate according to budgetary requirements or require a higher flexibility on 
the expenditure side than the current financial perspective framework allows. 
However, frequent amendments to the tax rate would in practice be 
unwelcome by taxpayers (legal uncertainty, technically and administratively 
cumbersome procedures) and could conflict with national tax-setting. A 
progressive approach, consisting in maintaining a limited GNI resource while 
increasing the share of tax-based resources, appears preferable. 
A reform of the own resources structure should thus focus on the budgetary neutral 
introduction of a new tax-based own resource representing up to half of the budget. 
5. TOWARDS A FINANCING SYSTEM BASED ON CONTRIBUTIONS BY MEMBER STATES 
AND CITIZENS 
5.1. Increasing the share of tax-based own resources 
The reform of the financing system should tackle the drawbacks of the current 
system, i.e. the absence of a direct link to EU citizens, dependence on transfers from 
national treasuries and unjustified complexity, while contributing as far as possible to 
an efficient allocation of resources. Other criteria become less relevant for the new 
resources, as long as the overall system allows them to be met to a reasonable degree. 
For reasons of equity between citizens in different Member States, the introduction 
of new fiscal resources requires a sufficient prior harmonisation of the tax base. The 
choice of the most appropriate tax-based resource crucially depends on the actual 
degree of tax base harmonisation. 
The existence of regional arbitrariness9 or the presence of cross-border externalities 
are strong arguments for harmonising tax bases and rates, which could also justify 
assigning all or part of the corresponding tax revenue to the EU level. This could 
contribute to reducing inefficient allocation of economic resources. 
Increasing the share of tax-based own resources for the EU budget does not require 
any new taxes. It does, however, imply a decision on sharing either revenue or tax 
rates between the national and the EU level. The EU share could be levied as part of 
the national rate paid by taxpayers. The total EU budget, anyway limited by the own 
resources ceiling to a maximum of 1.24% of EU-GNI, would not increase, as 
                                               
9 Regional arbitrariness refers to a situation where it is difficult to determine the exact share of a tax base 
to be allocated to individual Member States or where there is a high (potential) mismatch between the 
country collecting the tax and the country of residence of the economic agents bearing the burden of the 
tax. 
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revenue from the tax-based resource would be offset by a corresponding decrease of 
the current GNI-based resource. 
The following sections illustrate three main options in order to improve the 
functioning of the EU financing system. All three retain the current GNI-based 
resource as a residual balancing resource as well as the traditional own resources, but 
assume that up to half of the budget is financed by a new fiscal resource that would 
also replace the current statistical VAT. 
5.2. Option 1 – An own resources system with fiscal resources related to  
 energy consumption 
Under the new directive on energy taxation10 most energy products are subject to 
Community taxation. Although the adopted directive on energy taxation was not 
prepared for the purpose of introducing new own resources, it nevertheless creates 
suitable conditions for it by harmonising tax bases and establishing minimum rates. 
A fiscal resource on energy products would, however, not need to be based on all 
products covered by the directive. An EU levy could be limited to the tax base 
related to motor fuel used for road transport (leaded and unleaded petrol, diesel, LPG 
and natural gas used for transport). This would be relatively simple from an 
administrative point of view as the tax base is already harmonized at EU level and as 
most possibilities of tax differentiation allowed by the directive apply to other energy 
products. EU rates below half of the minimum rates in the energy taxation directive 
would be enough to finance half of the EU budget. The main decisions would bear 
on the rates to apply and possible variations according to the product and use. 
                                               
10 Directive 2003/96/EC of 27.10.2003 of the Council restructuring the Community framework for the 
taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ L 283 of 31.10.2003). 
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An EU levy on aviation fuel or the related emissions might be a useful complement 
to a levy on motor fuel for road transport. The European air transport system is 
highly integrated and aviation emissions transcend national borders. There are 
therefore good arguments for taxing such emissions at the EU level, as a way of 
internalising the external socio-economic costs of climate change and other 
environmental effects caused by aviation into the price of air travel. However, 
aviation fuel (kerosene) is currently exempted from taxation for cross-border flights. 
From a technical point of view, the introduction of a fiscal resource based on road 
transport fuel would be possible in a relatively short period of time (around 3-6 
years). 
5.3. Option 2 – An own resources system with a fiscal VAT resource 
Due to its direct link with daily consumption, and contrary to the current “statistical” 
VAT resource, the application of an EU rate to national VAT bases would create a 
clear direct link between the financing of the EU budget and the citizen and increase 
awareness of the costs of the Union. 
A genuinely fiscal VAT resource would be implemented through an EU rate as part 
of the national VAT rate paid by taxpayers. The rate would be levied together with 
the national rate on the same taxable base. Citizens would not have to bear an 
additional tax burden as the EU rate would be offset by an equivalent decrease of the 
national VAT rate. For example, if the national VAT rate were at 21 %, and an EU 
rate at 1 %, the national rate would come down to 20 %. The total VAT rate levied 
would still be 21 %. 
For visibility purposes, the EU VAT and the national VAT should appear as separate 
taxes on the invoice or receipt that a taxable person provides to his customer. 
An EU rate of 1 % would be enough to cover about half of the financing needs of the 
EU budget. 
Potential difficulties with this proposal are related to incomplete harmonisation of 
Member States’ VAT systems mainly linked to zero-rated goods. Another potential 
difficulty may stem from a different share of the VAT base in national income across 
Member States (the so-called regressivity of VAT), which since 1988 has pushed 
Member States to reduce its share in own resources. On the other hand, seen from a 
consumer perspective, the EU rate would have the same impact on comparable 
consumers across the Union11. 
Technically, the introduction of an EU VAT rate would be possible in a relatively 
short period of time (up to 6 years). 
                                               
11 Assuming the effect of zero-rates are neutralised (see also annex to this report). 
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5.4. Option 3 – An own resources system with a fiscal resource based on  
 corporate income 
As for the other two options, also an EU fiscal resource based on corporate income 
would require a prior definition of a common (consolidated) tax base, which would 
be applied to companies. Such harmonisation would contribute to the proper 
functioning of the internal market and a more efficient allocation of economic 
resources which are currently distorted by cross-border externalities. Today, the 
existence of 25 separate national tax systems and the multiplicity of tax laws, 
conventions and practices represent in itself a barrier to cross-border economic 
activity. It imposes substantial compliance costs on companies operating across 
borders in the EU and leads to numerous loopholes in the tax system. 
Current work on a comprehensive reform of company taxation is focussed on the 
concept of a common (consolidated) tax base, in all likelihood for a sub-group of 
interested Member States, to remove tax obstacles to the internal market. This work 
does not envisage any action on tax rates, nor is it conceived as a method for raising 
revenues for the EU budget.  
The option of a corporate income tax would imply setting a minimum tax rate to the 
harmonized tax base. 
Revenue from corporate income taxes is significant, with total revenue in the EU 
currently representing on average 2.6 % of total EU GNI. Thus, for the needs of the 
EU budget less than a quarter of that revenue would need to be assigned to the EU. 
Given the current state of affairs, this alternative would take longest to implement, 
both from a political as well as from an administrative perspective. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of a new tax-based own resource replacing the current statistical 
VAT-based resource and financing a significant part of the EU budget would make it 
possible to overcome the main drawbacks of the current system, i.e. the absence of a 
direct link to EU citizens, overwhelming dependence on transfers from national 
treasuries and unjustified complexity. It could also contribute to a better allocation of 
economic resources in the EU. Even if accounting for a lower share of total own 
resources than under the current system, the GNI-based resource should continue to 
play an important role and ensure that the system reasonably fulfils all relevant 
criteria. 
The Commission proposes three main candidates as possible future fiscal own 
resources: a resource based on 1. energy consumption, 2. national VAT bases and 3. 
corporate income. 
A resource based on energy consumption and conceived as an EU levy on motor fuel 
for road transport would be a sufficient and stable financing source for the EU 
budget and would create a direct link to the citizens. The tax base is already 
harmonised at EU level. It could be complemented by an EU levy on aviation fuel or 
the related emissions thus ending the current tax exemption for jet fuel and setting a 
price on the environmental costs of aviation. 
Tax base harmonisation in the field of VAT is quite advanced and it is a sufficient 
and stable source of revenue. A fiscal VAT resource would make the financing of the 
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EU highly visible to EU citizens. It would also be evolutionary, since it would entail 
a reform of existing provisions rather than the introduction of a completely new 
resource. From an administrative point of view, its introduction would not present 
any insurmountable difficulties. 
Due to the link to a common EU policy and the presence of cross-border 
externalities, revenue from a harmonised company tax base would also be a suitable 
financing source for the EU budget. 
The European Union is a Union of Member States and citizens. Any of the three 
candidates for fiscal own resources examined above would transpose this concept 
into the area of financing the EU budget. Strengthening the direct link of citizens to 
the budget would also help focussing expenditure debates on substance rather than 
on purely "national" budget "net positions". 
Obviously, any new assignment of a resource to the EU budget has not only to be 
decided unanimously by Council, but also has to be ratified by all Member States´ 
parliaments. 
The implementation of an energy- or VAT-based resource would be feasible over the 
medium-term, whereas a fiscal resource based on corporate income is to be seen as a 
much longer-term option. What is needed now is a political orientation to prepare the 
conditions for reforming the structure of the existing own resources. In this regard, 
the Commission calls on the Council: 
Ø to discuss the options proposed in this report; 
Ø to take note of the Commission’s intention to prepare a roadmap in view 
of replacing, on the basis of a Commission proposal, the current VAT 
resource by a genuinely tax-based own resource by 2014. 
In order to provide a short-term solution to the issue of excessive budgetary 
imbalances to be operational as from the beginning of the next Financial Perspective, 
the Commission proposes 
Ø to introduce a generalized correction mechanism to correct excessive 
budgetary imbalances according to the proposed Council decision on the 
system of own resources and the accompanying proposed implementing 
measures. 
